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Abstract 
The corruption is a complex and generalized phenomenon all over the world, with cultural, 
social, psychological, political and economical dimensions. The defining and the studying of the 
phenomenon are going through the most different thinking filters known in the specialized 
literature: social-cultural, political, administrative and economic. The article’s aim is to quantify 
and analyze the relationship between corruption and political, administrative and economic 
determinants factors, through a regressive "pool data" model. The sample includes 135 countries 
of the world, from all continents, with different degrees of economic development and political-
administrative structures, for the period 1996-2008. What is interesting is that, the study shows 
the distortion into the government intervention function in the economy, seen as a significant 
proliferation factor for the corruption phenomenon. This connection has different intensity, as the 
state is developed, developing or in transition. Moreover, there is a number of unobserved 
factors, which emphasizes or temperate in temporal approach the relationship between corruption 
- political, administrative and economic determinants factors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The corruption is a complex and generalized phenomenon all over the world, with economical, 
cultural, social, psychological, political, administrative and religious dimensions. By 
consequence, defining and the studying of the phenomenon are going through the most different 
thinking filters known in the specialized literature: economic, social-cultural, political, 
administrative and religious. In the economic approach, the government controls the distribution 
of revenues and the taxation of onerous costs. The private individuals and firms, in such context, 
tend to receive the advantages from public authority. If the “payment for advantages” is illegal, 
then we can talk about corruption. In an institutional view, for Rose-Ackerman (1999), the 
corruption is a symptom for the situations in which the management of the state is inefficient. 
All these factors are acting differently, as countries are developed, developing or in transition. 
According to Cyper & Dietz (2008), performed over time, it was observed that the developed 
economies, with strong industrial sectors and competitive market, have a low level of corruption. 
On the opposite side, corruption proliferates in the developing countries and those in transition, 
with poorly developed economic sectors and weak competitive markets. Moreover, the factors 
intensity can be “accentuated or temperate" temporally under the parallel influence of unobserved 
factors, such as: culture, psychosocial individual profile, technological changes, change of 
government fiscal policies, natural cataclysms, wars or other internal conflicts.  
 
2. Theoretical fundaments 
 
In the economical view, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) see the corruption as a problem related to the 
monopolistic market structure, not a competitive one, and recommend that policies should focus 
more closely on the phenomenon of corruption and not on the public sector itself. In a particular 
way, Al-Marhubi (2000) finds a significant relationship between inflation and corruption, which 
suggests that a high rate of inflation came with a high corruption. For Wang & Rosenau (2001), 
the corruption is the secret collaboration between public officials and private actors for private 
financial gains in contravention of the public’s interest 
Drehel and Schneider (2006) connect the shadow economy with corruption, as an inverse or 
direct relationship, depending on the degree of the state development. Based on a model of 
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general trade policy and fiscal economic equilibrium, Carraro et al. (2006) shows that corruption 
affects economic growth with different intensities from one period to another (many studies 
refute this results). Moreover, connecting with economic growth, a couple of authors identify and 
analyze the inverse relationship between corruption and the level of social welfare. From this 
group we regard Svensson (2005). 
In the social-cultural sense, Nye (1967) considers the corruption as a deviation from the formal 
duties of a public role, in individual compartmental approach: personal, close family and private 
clique. The definition summarizes a group of elements, such as bribery, theft, nepotism and 
misappropriation. Hungtington (1969) identifies different degrees of corruption, from one culture 
to another, with higher intensity in the modernization periods, the corruption being a social 
pathology, according to Carvajal (1999).  
Husted (1999) describes a cultural profile of a corrupt country as one in which there is high 
uncertainty avoidance, high masculinity, and high power distance (without individualism, which 
is highly correlated with GNP per capita). Getz & Volkema (2001) revealed that uncertainty 
avoidance moderated the relationship between economic adversity and corruption, whereas 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance were positively associated with corruption.  
Nichols et al. (2004), based on a study that includes two states on different continents, argues that 
the corruption perception seeks the recent history of a population, determined by the foreign 
domination, the democratic change and the transition periods. Barr and Serra (2006) see the 
corruption as a phenomenon set of preferences and rules, following the slogan "not engaging in 
bribery because it is harmful to society". They conclude, concise, that the corruption is, in parte, a 
cultural phenomenon.  
In the political-administrative approach, Hungtington (1969) reveals that the phenomenon of 
corruption is an effective absence of the political institutions and Rose-Ackerman (1978) shows 
that the decentralization of government decision-making power increases the risk of corruption, 
because the review and detection limits are confirmed. Tanzi (1998) accepts the definition of the 
World Bank, in which the corruption is the simplest kind of public power abuse for private 
benefits, gifts, mainly related to the state monopoly and the way the government perceives the 
power. Simply, in a similar way, Rajib and Subarna (2000) develop a general definition of the 
corruption, as an abuse of public power for private benefit. Referring to the quality of 
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bureaucratic apparatus, Drehel and Schneider (2006) show that the better quality of the public 
institutions reduces corruption. 
In the religious perspective, a previous research has found that religion influences the tendency of 
the corruption phenomena. According to Deveterre (2002), the high attention to virtue ethics is 
the most effective way to combat corruption. Moreover, religions, such as Christianity, may limit 
the effects of this global problem. Particularly, Paldham (2001) founds that the percentage of 
Protestants was negatively related to corruption, after controlling for known economic predictors 
(real gross domestic product per capita). Several years after, Jude (2004) considers that the 
percentage of Protestants within a nation will be negatively related to the level of corruption 
within a national economy.   
This scientific approach is intended to analyze the relationship between corruption and its 
determinant factors of political-administrative and economic nature. According to the mentioned 
premise, all the theoretical presented elements allow us to formulate a series of theoretical 
working assumptions, which consider two of the approaching coordinates of corruption: one 
politico-administrative coordinate and another economical one. 
The hypotheses are: 
H1: The level of corruption is growing as the civil liberties are less respected; the government 
structures and the government intervention in the economy are more extended. 
H2: The level of corruption is growing as the social welfare is decreasing.  
In summary, the meanings of the hypothesis’ work relations are: 
 
Table 1: The sense („the sings”) of the hypothesis’ work relations 
The trend of 
corruption level 
The determinant factors of corruption 
The trend of 
determinant factors 
of corruption  
+ 1. Civil liberty - 
+ 2. Public administration structures + 
+ 3. Government intervention in economy + 
+ 4. Social welfare - 
- 1. Civil liberty + 
- 2. Public administration structures - 
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- 3. Government intervention in economy - 
- 4. Social welfare + 
 
The fundamental assumption is that corruption is a complex phenomenon determined by a couple 
of factors, such as: civil liberties, the administrative government structure, the intensity of state 
intervention in economy and the level of social welfare. The linkages are in the same sense for 
the case of administrative government structure and the intensity of government intervention and 
contrary for the case of civil liberties and social welfare. Moreover, these factors are acting 
differently over the time from one type of economy to another and there are a number of 
unobserved disturbances. 
 
3. Methods and results 
 
To quantify and analyze the relationship between corruption (dependent variable) and politico-
administrative and economic determinants factors (independent variables), were considered the 
period 1996-2008 and a sample of 135 countries of the world, from all continents, with different 
degrees of economic development and political-administrative structures. According to Cyper & 
Dietz (2008), for a complex approach, the data set was divided into three cross-sectional panels, 
as economies are developed - 34 countries, developing - 87 countries and in transition - 14 
countries (UNCTAD classification 2009 - Annex). The corruption is quantified by the "Freedom 
from corruption” index - FC (the component of the Index of Economic Freedom), developed by 
The Heritage Foundation, on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 indicates a very high level of 
corruption and 100 an extremely small one. 
The "Civil Liberties" (L) factor is founded by Freedom House - Civil Liberties, the "government 
structure" (GS) factor is quantified by The Heritage Foundation - Government Size (the 
component of the Index of Economic Freedom) and "social welfare" (HDI) factor is constructed 
by the United Nations Development Program - The Human Development Index. 
1. The "Civil Liberties" index includes the freedom of expression, assembly, association, 
education and religion and has a range of intensity between 1 and 7; the value of 1 is assigned to 
the states in which the degree of freedom is very high and 7 to the ones which have a very small 
one. 
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2. The "Government size” index is a component of the "Index of Economic Freedom", which 
considers the level of government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, including all levels of 
government, such as central/federal, intermediate/state and local level. The scale value is between 
0 and 100. The minimum level corresponds to the states which have a small government 
spending of GDP, with a reduce redistribution of GDP and government intervention in economy 
and vice versa. 
3. The "Human Development Index" measures the degree of human development by combining 
life expectancy, education levels and realized income, on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 denotes a 
minimum level of welfare and 1 a maximum one. 
Because the considered factors have different scales of measurement, for a comparative analysis, 
the levels of variables were normalized: 
 
MinMax
Max
Normalized GSLFCGSLFC
GSLFCGSLFCGSLFC
,,,,
,,,,
,,
−
−
=                                           (1) 
 
[ ]1,0,, ∈NormalizedGSLFC                                                        (2) 
 
[ ]1,0∈HDI                                                                (3) 
 
In this case, for FC - 0 indicates a very high level of corruption and 1 an extremely small one; for 
L - 0 is assigned to the states in which the degree of freedom is very high and 1 to the ones which 
have a very small one; and for GS - 0 is the minimum level corresponds to the states which have 
a small government spending of GDP and 1 to the ones which have a high government spending 
of GDP. 
Based on the normalized illustrated variables, the sense of changes existing between corruption 
and its determinant factors, in according with theoretical assumptions made above, is as follows: 
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Table 2: The expected sense („the sings”) of the relations between FC - L, GS and HDI, 
according to working hypothesis 
The trend of FC index 
The determinant 
index of FC 
The determinant index 
expected trend  
- 1. L + 
- 2. GS + 
- 3. HDI - 
+ 1. L - 
+ 2. GS - 
+ 3. HDI + 
 
The method of analysis used is the econometrical modeling (with software EViews 5.0), 
elaborating three “Pool Date”1 regressive models, with time-fixed effects, one for each type of 
economy, with this shape: 
ijtitit vλβxXαY +++=                                                    (4) 
where Yit represents the dependent variable - FC, α intercept term, β independent variables 
coefficients, Xit independent variable - L, GS and HDI, tλ  time-varying intercept (captures all of 
the variables that affect Yit and that vary over time but are constant cross-sectionally), ijv  the 
remainder disturbance (capturing everything that is left unexplained about Yit), i cross-sectional 
units observed for dated periods - (the number of states) and t the period of time (years 1996-
2008). 
With dummy variables, the model could be: 
 
ijtTt2t1itit vxDTλ ...xD2λxD1λβxXY +++++=                          (5) 
 
where D1 represents the dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the 1996 year and 0 elsewhere, 
and so on. 
Finally, the model becomes:  
 
                                                 
1
 For econometric model we used the econometric software Eviews 5.0. 
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it2008T1996it3it2it1it vD x...xDxHDIβxGSβxLβFC ++++++= λλ1     (6) 
 
For testing of three models, I corrected both period heteroskedasticity and general correlation of 
observations (except the second model, only with heteroskedasticity correction) within a given 
cross-section because the observations are not equal weight in estimation. Moreover, to obtain the 
robust coefficient standard errors I applied the Period SUR (PCSE) method. 
The econometric analysis of three type economy has two steps: 
a. The econometric tests of the „pool data” time-fixed effects models. 
b. The “unit root test” of the residuals. 
a. The econometric tests of the „pool data” time-fixed effects models, for each type of 
economies, are presented in Appendix, Tables A1-A3. 
For all type of economies, the tests of models show the following:  
- the absolute values of the standard errors corresponding to the coefficients of the function are 
lower than the values of the coefficients, witch sustains the correct estimation of these 
coefficients (a conclusion reinforced by the low values of the probabilities); 
- the value of the correlation coefficient, shows a significant statistical correlation between the 
dependent variable - FC and the independent variables - L, GS and HDI (the changes in the FC 
are reflected considerably in the changes of L, GS and HDI); 
- the value of F-statistic is bigger then the F-critical value (the probability is almost 0), showing 
that the model is relevant; 
- the Durbin-Watson test (with a resulting value under the critical point of 2) shows that the 
residual variables are not autocorrelated. 
b. The “unit root test” of the residuals. For verifying the stationarity of the residuals are used 
the „unit root tests” proposes by Levin, Lin & Chu, Breitung t-stat, Im, Pesaran & Shin W-stat, 
ADF, PP and Hadri Z-stat. The results are illustrated in Appendix, Tables A4-A6.  
For the developed and developing economies the tests Levin, Lin & Chu; Im, Pesaran & Shin W-
stat; ADF and PP indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected (except Hadri Z-stat test and, 
partially, the Breitung t-stat), meaning that the „residuals of the cross-sectional group” is 
stationary.  
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At limit, for economies in transition, the tests Levin, Lin & Chu; the Breitung t-stat; Im, Pesaran 
& Shin W-stat; ADF and PP indicate that the null hypothesis of the unit root can be rejected 
(except Hadri Z-stat test). 
In conclusion, all three models may be considered representative to describe, at international 
level, the connection between FC and L, GS & HDI.  
 
4. Discussion 
 
The obtained results based on the three constructed models show that corruption is mainly the 
result of political-administrative and economic factors. The main information can be summaries 
in this way:  
 
Table 7: The main results of relationship between “FC-L, GS and HDI” 
in the case of  Developed economies, Developing economies and Economy in Transition 
Developed 
economies 
Developing 
economies 
Economies in 
transition Type of 
economies Coefficients 
C -2.2014 0.1424 0.1651 
L -0.2824 -0.1159 -0.1091 
GS -0.0407 -0.1705 -0.1873 
HDI 3.1875 0.5449 0.3190 
Year Period fixed (dummy variables) 
1996 0.0948 0.0426 -0.0246 
1997 0.0621 0.0392 -0.0268 
1998 0.0819 0.0244 -0.0070 
1999 0.0547 0.0225 -0.0068 
2000 -0.0018 0.0083 0.0147 
2001 0.0070 0.0108 0.0090 
2002 0.0083 0.0149 -0.0026 
2003 -0.0421 -0.0050 0.0159 
2004 -0.0435 -0.0194 0.0216 
2005 -0.0584 -0.0262 0.0031 
2006 -0.0623 -0.0227 -0.0044 
2007 -0.0534 -0.0128 0.0019 
2008 -0.0474 -0.0132 0.0061 
 
All three elaborated models confirm the proposed theoretical hypotheses, following the idea that 
the increasing of corruption (minimizing FC index) is the result of the limitation of civil liberties 
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(maximizing L index), the extension of public administration structures, the augmentation of 
government intervention in economy (maximizing GS index) and the damage of social welfare 
(minimizing HDI index). 
In other words, the corruption is high, if the civil liberties are reduced, the structure of 
government is extended, the government intervention in the economy is increased and the social 
welfare is decreased. Per a contrario, the corruption is low, if the civil liberties are higher, the 
structure of government is reduced, the government intervention in the economy is decreased and 
the social welfare is increased. 
These influences are different intensity as the economies are developed, developing or in 
transition. More, there are other several disturbing unobservable factors, with constant and 
periodic action. The periodic factors act on the corruption differently, from one year to another, 
in positive or negative sense, but they have very little effect on corruption (the impact is less than 
10% annually). 
In the developed economies the main factor of corruption is the social welfare, followed by civil 
liberties, government structure and intensity of the state intervention in economy. In developing 
economies and economies in transition the corruption depends mainly on the social welfare, then 
on the state intervention in economy and civil liberties. 
On this basis, a low level of corruption is assimilated to developed economies, with high life 
expectancy, strong literacy and educational attainment and high level of GDP per capita. In this 
country people have freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights 
and personal autonomy without interference from the state. Moreover, the bureaucratic structures 
are less extensive and state intervention in economy is more temperate, encouraging the private 
initiative and market competition rules.  
Unfortunately, in the developed economies there are significant unobserved factors that 
constantly stimulate corruption, but also there is a set of unobserved factors with periodical 
positive or negative actions, with insignificant influence. 
A high level of corruption is characteristic for developing economies or economies in 
transition, because the life expectancy is low, the degree of literacy and education is precarious 
and the level of GDP per capita is low. In addition, freedoms of expression and belief are low, 
associational and organizational rights limited and personal autonomy has strong interference 
from the state.  
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In these economies the state has developed an excessive bureaucratic structure and the state’s 
corrective intervention in economy determines often distortions and inefficiencies in the resource 
allocation. 
In contrast to developed economies, in the developing economies and the economies in transition 
the constant unobserved factors have a major destructive influence on corruption. Similarly, the 
unobserved factors with periodical acting have an insignificant positive or negative influence. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
As a complex phenomenon, the corruption hits the entire world, regardless of the geographical 
location, population, level of economic development, political regime or type of government. 
There are two categories of factors that influence the corruption: some are observed and have 
constant periodic influence (social welfare, civil liberties, government structure and intensity of 
the state intervention in economy), while others factors are unobserved, with stimulative or 
nonstimulative, constant or periodic influences. 
Main observable factors act differently as the economies are developed, developing or in 
transition. 
In the developed economies the most important factor is the level of social welfare, followed by 
civil liberties and government size. In other economies, social welfare is followed by the 
government size, not by civil liberties. In addition, all these factors are "corrected" by a set of 
unobservable influences, positive or negative, with constant or periodic acting. 
In such conditions, the improvement of corruption phenomenon is difficult to undertake. 
However, based on the described results, we believe that the corrective measures of corruption 
must be identified and divided in two categories: one for the developed economies and other for 
the developing and economies in transition. 
a. The improvement of corruption in developed economies must be focused mainly on the 
public health system efficiency (maximizing life expectancy) and the consolidation of 
educational system (maximizing the degree of literacy and the level of educational attainment). 
A second action, in order of importance, is strengthens of all freedoms of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights and personal autonomy toward state.  
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In the developed economies, the extension of bureaucracy and the state intervention in economy 
may be adjusted from a minimum level of efficiency to a maximum level, which corresponds to 
the point where they exceed the degree of social welfare and civil liberties. 
A great attention should be paid in these economies on unobserved factors that have a strong, 
stimulative and constant influence on corruption and exceed the positive unobserved periodical 
factors (period dummy). Therefore, regarding corruption, the countries with developed 
economies have a high sensitivity to certain nonperiodical factors. 
b. The improvement of corruption in developing economies and economies in transition 
must be focused preponderant on the public health reforms (increase of the life expectancy level) 
and the reconstruction of the educational system (positive effect on degree of literacy and level of 
educational attainment).  
A second step should be polarized on compression of the bureaucracy structures, the increase of 
the bureaucratic professionalism and performance and implementation of the measures to correct 
the market allocations, distribution and stabilization. Moreover, the state must "cement" the 
private initiative and the market competition rules. 
Not least, these countries must make serious efforts to strength democracy, respecting the 
freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights and personal autonomy 
toward state.  
A big advantage of developing and in transition economies is given by unobserved nonperiodical 
factors that have a small but destructive influence on corruption (highest in the transition 
economies). Moreover, these constant factors counteract successfully the unobserved temporal 
negative factors. 
In conclusion, we can appreciate that the improvement measures of corruption phenomenon 
should be adapted as economies are developed, developing or in transition. Moreover, in a state 
with developed economy a great attention must be focused on the unobserved constant factors, 
these types of economies showing a high sensitivity in this sense. 
The main results suggest that the corruption is a “key question” especially in developing and in 
transition economies, but the disturbance constant unobserved factors decrease the phenomenon 
and compensate the periodical negative unobserved factors.   
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Appendix 
Table A1: The econometric tests of the „pool data” time-fixed effects model  
FC-L, GS and HDI - Developed economies 
Dependent Variable: FC?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 18:09   
Sample: 1996 2008   
Included observations: 13   
Cross-sections included: 34   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 442  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. 
        correction)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C -2.201361 0.271578 -8.105822 0.0000 
L? -0.282434 0.052179 -5.412787 0.0000 
GS? -0.040743 0.020367 -2.000468 0.0461 
HDI? 3.187540 0.298404 10.68196 0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)     
1996--C 0.094760    
1997--C 0.062134    
1998--C 0.081941    
1999--C 0.054703    
2000--C -0.001758    
2001--C 0.007019    
2002--C 0.008297    
2003--C -0.042120    
2004--C -0.043547    
2005--C -0.058358    
2006--C -0.062332    
2007--C -0.053380    
2008--C -0.047359    
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.680544     Mean dependent var 1.385802 
Adjusted R-squared 0.669296     S.D. dependent var 1.732771 
S.E. of regression 0.996462     Sum squared resid 422.9913 
F-statistic 60.50123     Durbin-Watson stat 1.978590 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.632566     Mean dependent var 0.649946 
Sum squared resid 8.396228     Durbin-Watson stat 0.304257 
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Table A2: The econometric tests of the „pool data” time-fixed effects model 
FC-L, GS and HDI - Developing economies 
Dependent Variable: FC?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Cross-section weights)  
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 18:09   
Sample: 1996 2008   
Included observations: 13   
Cross-sections included: 87   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 1131  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. 
        correction)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C 0.142492 0.020791 6.853494 0.0000 
L? -0.115900 0.011634 -9.962188 0.0000 
GS? -0.170513 0.019265 -8.851125 0.0000 
HDI? 0.544997 0.016274 33.48911 0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)     
1996--C 0.042580    
1997--C 0.039202    
1998--C 0.024439    
1999--C 0.022467    
2000--C 0.008307    
2001--C 0.010848    
2002--C 0.014932    
2003--C -0.004954    
2004--C -0.019449    
2005--C -0.026229    
2006--C -0.022748    
2007--C -0.012767    
2008--C -0.013192    
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.740736     Mean dependent var 0.437109 
Adjusted R-squared 0.737248     S.D. dependent var 0.308896 
S.E. of regression 0.158338     Sum squared resid 27.95410 
F-statistic 212.3757     Durbin-Watson stat 1.960999 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.316376     Mean dependent var 0.296764 
Sum squared resid 28.36319     Durbin-Watson stat 0.129329 
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Table A3: The econometric tests of the „pool data” time-fixed effects model 
FC-L, GS and HDI – Economies in transition 
Dependent Variable: FC?   
Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR)  
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 18:33   
Sample: 1996 2008   
Included observations: 13   
Cross-sections included: 14   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 182  
Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Period weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. 
        correction)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
     
     C 0.165086 0.021603 7.641883 0.0000 
L? -0.109092 0.006595 -16.54245 0.0000 
GS? -0.187252 0.004235 -44.21857 0.0000 
HDI? 0.318981 0.027749 11.49523 0.0000 
Fixed Effects (Period)     
1996--C -0.024648    
1997--C -0.026826    
1998--C -0.006954    
1999--C -0.006837    
2000--C 0.014686    
2001--C 0.008961    
2002--C -0.002604    
2003--C 0.015910    
2004--C 0.021613    
2005--C 0.003104    
2006--C -0.004368    
2007--C 0.001884    
2008--C 0.006079    
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     
 Weighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.990013     Mean dependent var 2.168570 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989111     S.D. dependent var 9.939635 
S.E. of regression 1.037226     Sum squared resid 178.5890 
F-statistic 1097.040     Durbin-Watson stat 1.998995 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 Unweighted Statistics   
     
     R-squared 0.346309     Mean dependent var 0.210363 
Sum squared resid 1.155049     Durbin-Watson stat 0.542193 
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Table A4: The “unit root test” of the residuals - Developed economies 
Group unit root test: Summary   
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 18:54  
Sample: 1996 2008   
Series: RESIDAUSTRALIA, RESIDAUSTRIA, RESIDBELGIUM, 
… RESIDUNITEDSTATES   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -10.9395  0.0000  34  389 
Breitung t-stat -0.29030  0.3858  34  355 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -8.18247  0.0000  34  389 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  191.506  0.0000  34  389 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  199.824  0.0000  34  408 
     
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  8.56268  0.0000  34  442 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Table A5: The “unit root test” of the residuals - Developing economies 
Group unit root test: Summary   
Date: 05/25/09   Time: 18:09  
Sample: 1996 2008   
Series: RESIDALGERIA, RESIDARGENTINA, RESIDBAHRAIN, 
… RESIDZAMBIA   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -12.8730  0.0000  87  1000 
Breitung t-stat -0.68155  0.2478  87  913 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -5.71864  0.0000  87  1000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  319.317  0.0000  87  1000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  337.890  0.0000  87  1044 
     
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  14.3549  0.0000  87  1131 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Table A6: The “unit root test” of the residuals - Developing economies 
Group unit root test: Summary   
Date: 05/23/09   Time: 19:06  
Sample: 1996 2008   
Series: RESIDARMENIA, RESIDAZERBAIJAN, RESIDGEORGIA, 
… RESIDMACEDONIA, RESIDUKRAINE  
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
Automatic selection of maximum lags  
Automatic selection of lags based on SIC: 0 to 2 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett kernel 
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -2.98818  0.0014  14  164 
Breitung t-stat -1.41211  0.0790  14  150 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -1.25651  0.1045  14  164 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  33.0172  0.2351  14  164 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  42.5182  0.0387  14  168 
     
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  4.57709  0.0000  14  182 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Annex 
 
ElSalvador Namibia UnitedArabEmirates Netherlands 
EquatorialGuinea Nepal Uruguay NewZealand Developing 
economies 
Ethiopia Nicaragua Venezuela  Norway 
Algeria Gabon Niger Vietnam Poland 
Argentina Ghana Nigeria Yemen Portugal 
Bahrain Guatemala Pakistan Zambia Romania 
Bangladesh GuineaBissau Panama Developed 
economies 
Slovakia 
Belize Haiti Paraguay Australia Slovenia 
Benin Honduras Peru Austria Spain 
Bolivia India Philippines Belgium Sweden 
Botswana Indonesia Rwanda Bulgaria Switzerland 
Brazil Iran Samoa Canada UnitedKingdom 
BurkinaFaso Jamaica SaudiArabia Cyprus UnitedStates 
Burundi Kenya Senegal CzechRepublic Economies in 
transition 
Cambodia Kuwait Singapore Denmark Armenia 
Cameroon Lao  SouthAfrica Estonia Azerbaijan 
CapeVerde Lesotho SriLanka Finland Georgia 
CentralAfrican Libyan  Sudan France Kazakhstan 
Chad Madagascar Suriname Germany Kyrgyzstan 
Chile Malawi Swaziland Greece Tajikistan 
China Malaysia Syria Hungary Uzbekistan 
Colombia Mali Tanzania Iceland Albania 
Congo Mauritania Thailand Ireland Belarus 
CongoDemocratic Mauritius Togo Italy Croatia 
CostaRica Mexico TrinidadTobago Japan Moldova 
DominicanRepublic Mongolia Tunisia Latvia Russia 
Ecuador Morocco Turkey Lithuania Macedonia 
Egypt Mozambique Uganda Malta Ukraine 
 
 
 
